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interpreted and applied the much litigated Deceptive Trade
Practices Act (DTPA).' To recover under the DTPA, a plaintiff
must establish that he is a "consumer," that there was a false, misleading,
or deceptive act or an unconscionable act, and that this act or acts was a
producing cause of his damage. 2 Significant decisions reported during
* B.S., Cornell University; J.D., Southern Methodist University. Associate, Lynn,
Stodghill & Melsheimer, L.L.P., Dallas, Texas.
** B.S., United States Merchant Marine Academy; J.D., University of Tulsa. Partner,
William Christopher Carmody P.C., Dallas, Texas.
1. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-17.826 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1994) [here-
inafter DTPA].
2. Custom Controls Co. v. MDS Qantel, Inc., 746 S.W.2d 261,263 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [1st Dist.] 1987), rev'd, Qantel Business Sys., Inc. v. Custom Controls Co., 761 S.W.2d
302 (Tex. 1988); Miller v. Soliz, 648 S.W.2d 734, 739 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983, no
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this period addressed each of these elements as well as methods to com-
pute damages for successful DTPA claims. This article discusses those
and other important decisions.
I. PROPER PLAINTIFFS: WHO IS A CONSUMER?
To recover under the DTPA, a plaintiff must establish that he is a "con-
sumer."'3 A consumer is defined as "an individual ... who seeks or ac-
quires by purchase or lease, any goods or services."' 4 In Melody Home
Mfg. Co v. Barnes5 the Texas Supreme Court recognized that in order to
achieve DTPA consumer status, two requirements must be met: (1) the
party "must have sought or acquired goods or services by purchase or
lease;" and (2) "the goods or services purchased or leased must form the
basis of the complaint."'6 Using this two-step analysis, Texas courts deter-
mine a plaintiff's consumer status.
A. STEP 1: EVEN THOUGH THE NAMED PLAINTIFF WAS NOT A
PARTY TO THE CONSUMER TRANSACTION BY WHICH THE
GOODS OR SERVICES WERE ACQUIRED BY
PURCHASE OR LEASE, HE MAY STILL
QUALIFY AS A DTPA CONSUMER.
When the plaintiff has not purchased or leased the goods or services at
issue, Texas courts have analyzed the plaintiff's DTPA consumer status
under the first step of the Melody Home test using an intended benefici-
ary theory.7 Under this theory, the plaintiff must be involved in the con-
sumer transaction at least to the extent he seeks to enjoy benefits as a
third party to the purchase or lease of the good or service.8 Upon estab-
lishing an acquired and intended benefit from the transaction, a third-
party plaintiff attains DTPA consumer status.
writ); Bormaster v. Henderson, 624 S.W.2d 655, 660 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1981, no writ); DTPA § 17.50(a)(1), (3).
3. See DTPA § 17.50.
4. DTPA § 17.45(4).
5. 741 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. 1987).
6. Id. at 351-52 (citing Sherman Simon Enter., Inc. v. Lorac Serv. Corp., 724 S.W.2d
13, 15 (Tex. 1987) and Cameron v. Terrell & Garrett, Inc., 618 S.W.2d 535, 539 (Tex. 1981)).
7. This theory evolved primarily from the Texas Supreme Court's holding in Kennedy
v. Sale, 689 S.W.2d 890, 892 (Tex. 1985). In Kennedy the court observed that the existence
of privity between the plaintiff and defendant is not a factor in deciding the plaintiff's
status as a DTPA consumer. Id. at 892-93. Instead, a plaintiff's standing should be deter-
mined based on his relationship to the consumer transaction. Id. While the Kennedy plain-
tiff had not purchased the group life insurance policy that formed the basis of his
complaint, the supreme court stated that he had "acquired" its benefits because his em-
ployer, the policy purchaser, provided him with coverage. Id. Because he "acquired" a
benefit from the purchase of the policy, the court held that he vicariously qualified as a
DTPA consumer. Id.; see also Wellborn v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 970 F.2d 1420, 1426 (5th
Cir. 1992) (holding that the son of a woman who bought a garage door opener was a
consumer under the DTPA because the primary purpose was to benefit the son).
8. Flenniken v, Longview Bank & Trust Co., 661 S.W.2d 705, 707-08 (Tex. 1983).
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In Brandon v. American Sterilizer Co.9 the Austin Court of Appeals
refused to expand this theory to encompass incidental beneficiaries to the
transaction. Genelle Brandon worked in a hospital. Her duties included
loading hospital equipment into gas sterilizers which used toxic gas to
sterilize the equipment. On October 29, 1984, Brandon arrived at work
to find the manufacturer's repair person working on one of the sterilizers.
After the worker left, the sterilizer began leaking toxic fumes. Brandon
suffered serious injuries from her exposure to these fumes. As a result,
she sued the manufacturer, American Sterilizer Company (AMSCO) on
a host of claims including DTPA violations.' 0 Finding that Brandon was
not a consumer, the trial court granted a directed verdict for AMSCO on
her DTPA claims."
On appeal, Brandon argued that she was a DTPA consumer because,
although she did not purchase the gas sterilizers, she sufficiently acquired
them, as well as AMSCO's maintenance services (provided pursuant to a
preventative maintenance agreement (PMA)), when the hospital as-
signed her to operate the sterilizers. 12 Applying the intended beneficiary
theory to the employment setting, the Austin Court of Appeals stated
that an employee-plaintiff is entitled to DTPA consumer status only for
claims involving goods or services the employer purchased or leased pri-
marily for the employee's benefit.' 3 After reviewing the evidence, the
court decided that the benefits derived from the sterilizers extended to
the hospital and its patients.14 Because the primary reason for the hospi-
tal's purchase of the sterilizer was not to benefit Brandon, the court held
that she did not qualify as a DTPA consumer for that transaction, knock-
ing out her DTPA claims based on the sterilizer's purchase.' 5
The court also held that Brandon failed to qualify as a DTPA consumer
with respect to the maintenance services provided under the PMA.
Based on the testimony of an AMSCO regional service manager and the
brochure used to advertise the services provided pursuant to the PMA,
the court concluded the main purpose of the PMA was to ensure proper
9. 880 S.W.2d 488 (Tex. App.-Austin 1994, n.w.h.).
10. Id. at 489, 491-92. The court decision was based on its analysis of three cases:
Kennedy v. Sale, 689 S.W.2d 890 (Tex. 1985); Lara v. Lile, 828 S.W.2d 536 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied); and Hernandez v. Kasco Ventures, Inc., 832 S.W.2d 629
(Tex. App.-El Paso 1992, no writ).
11. /d. at 490.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 492 (citing Kennedy, 689 S.W.2d at 892).
14. Id. According to the court, the main benefits of the sterilizer extended to the
hospital because it provided an in-house service which increased efficiency, and to the pa-
tients because it helped maintain a safer, more sterile environment. Id. Interestingly, the
court neglected to attribute the benefit of a safer, more sterile environment to the employ-
ees, as well as the patients. Perhaps this omission was made in the interest of clarity. While
a safer, more sterile environment also benefits the employees, the court must have consid-
ered this an incidental benefit, not a primary, intended benefit. Because an incidental ben-
efit is not sufficient to qualify Brandon as a consumer under the DTPA, the court did not




functioning and efficient use of the AMSCO sterilizer.' 6 Because the
PMA appeared solely to benefit the hospital and because Brandon failed
to offer any evidence that the hospital purchased the PMA to protect her
safety, the court held that she had not met her burden of proving DTPA
consumer status with respect to the PMA. 17 The Austin Court of Ap-
peals' message was clear - unless a third-party consumer can show that
she was the primary and intended beneficiary of the purchased item, she
will not qualify as a DTPA consumer.
In McDuffie v. Blassingame'8 the Amarillo Court of Appeals employed
a similar analysis. Ronald McDuffie, the plaintiff, filed suit against his ex-
wife, her attorney, the attorney's law firm, and the judge who presided
over the prior suit filed by his ex-wife which sought to modify his parent-
child relationship with their kids (collectively "the defendants"). 19 Mc-
Duffle alleged that the defendants violated the DTPA by forcing him to
trial.20 The trial court granted the defendants' motions for summary
judgment holding that McDuffie was not a DTPA consumer.21
On appeal, McDuffie argued that the defendants forced him to "ac-
quire" their services by citing him to appear in court.22 In her summary
judgment affidavit, his ex-wife swore that she never intended to provide
services to McDuffie. 23 Her attorney's affidavit stated that he neither
represented McDuffie nor received any benefit for advice he may have
given to him.24 This evidence indicated that McDuffie was neither a di-
rect nor intended beneficiary of the defendants' services. Because Mc-
Duffle was not involved in the defendants' contractual relations to the
extent that he derived any benefit from them, the court concluded that he
could not be considered a DTPA consumer with respect to those transac-
tions, and affirmed the trial court's ruling.25
16. Id. at 492-93. The manager testified that the PMA provided the purchaser with
preventive maintenance. The PMA was a scheduled series of inspections for the purchased
machine, intended to allow for replacement of bad components before they failed. Id. at
492. Furthermore, the PMA advertising brochure only promoted the following four (4)
benefits:
(1) freed hospital maintenance personnel for other tasks;
(2) assured hospital staff the full use of critical apparatus;
(3) assisted in protection of patient welfare; and
(4) maximized the return on the hospital's capital investment in the
sterilizer.
Id. at 493. Neither the manager's testimony nor the advertising brochure's copy suggested
that the hospital intended to benefit the employee's safety and welfare with its purchase of
the PMA.
17. Id. at 492.
18. 883 S.W.2d 329 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1994, writ requested).
19. Id. at 332.
20. Id.
21. Id.






B. STEP 2: DO THE GOODS OR SERVICES PURCHASED OR LEASED
FORM THE BASIS OF THE DTPA COMPLAINT?
After a plaintiff meets the first requirement of the Melody Home test
by showing- she is a direct purchaser/lessee or an intended beneficiary of
the transaction, she must also be able to show that those goods or services
acquired in the transaction form the basis of her complaint. This second
step inquiry was the DTPA issue presented in Hines v. Evergreen Ceme-
tery Association.26 In Hines the plaintiffs purchased a burial plot and the
interment of their father in that plot. A few days after the funeral, the
defendant, without notifying the plaintiffs, disinterred the body and
reinterred it a short distance away because the body had mistakenly been
partially buried in someone else's plot. The plaintiffs sued for DTPA vio-
lations alleging misrepresentations of the defendant's services and of the
rights conferred under their agreement, breach of express and implied
warranties, and that the defendant engaged in unconscionable conduct.27
In response, the defendant contended that the plaintiffs were not DTPA
consumers and thus, were not entitled to recover under the Act.28
While the Texarkana Court of Appeals stated that the plaintiffs clearly
met the first requirement of the Melody Home test, its inquiry focused on
whether or not the plaintiffs' purchase of a plot and burial service formed
the basis of their complaint.29 In its analysis, the court recognized that
the DTPA does not have a prescribed time period in relation to the con-
sumer transaction in which the defendant must have committed the com-
plained of acts.30 Because post-burial movement of their father's body
created a conflict with the understanding reached by the parties under the
original purchase agreement, 31 the court reasoned that the plaintiffs'
claim did originate from the purchase of the plot and interment services;
and therefore, they, as consumers, could pursue a claim for DTPA
violations.32
Another situation in which the second-step analysis of the DTPA con-
sumer commonly emerges is where the DTPA consumer complains of a
lender's actions. According to the Texas Supreme Court, a loan applicant
who seeks nothing more than the use of money from a lending institution
does not qualify as a DTPA consumer because "money" is not a
26. 865 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1993, no writ).
27. Id. at 268.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 269.
30. Id. (citing Flenniken, 661 S.W.2d at 707). The defendant relied upon a case which
held that post-sale conduct has no connection to the purchase of the goods or services, and
therefore, cannot constitute a DTPA violation. See Rosell v. Farmers Texas County Mut.
Ins. Co., 642 S.W.2d 278, 279 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1982, no writ) (citing American Ins.
Co. v. Reed, 626 S.W.2d 898 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1981, no writ)). Observing that these
decisions came prior to the Flenniken decision, the court concluded that they had been
overruled by Flenniken. 865 S.W.2d at 269.
31. Clearly, plaintiffs had not expected the defendant to "surreptitiously move the




"good."' 33 However, if the borrower's objective in seeking the loan is the
purchase or lease of a good or service, the borrower is then considered a
DTPA consumer as to all parties involved in the transaction, including
the lending institution.34 The confusion occurs when courts are deciding
whether it is the money or the underlying consumer transaction that
forms the basis of the plaintiff's complaint.
During the Survey period, the Amarillo Court of Appeals faced this
question in First State Bank of Canadian, Texas v. McMordie.35 Origi-
nally, McMordie approached the bank asking them to refinance an ex-
isting debt and to extend him a $1,000,000 line of credit. He claimed that
he hoped to use the money to make his annual cattle purchase. The bank
denied his loan application. McMordie testified, however, that the bank's
president, Godwin, had represented to him that he and the bank still
wanted to make the loan. Because the bank never made good on this
representation, McMordie sued them for DTPA violations.36 After the
jury awarded a $75,000 judgment on McMordie's DTPA claims, the bank
appealed, alleging that McMordie was not a consumer.37
Recognizing that the bank's refusal to extend him the loan was insuffi-
cient to gain him DTPA consumer status, McMordie claimed to qualify
because he sought the loan to purchase cattle, which is a "good."'38 The
court, however, saw through this sham. Noting that the record was void
of any objective manifestation that McMordie sought or acquired, by
purchase or lease, cattle, the court held that such a purchase or lease
could not be the basis of his complaint. 39 Because his complaint related
solely to the bank's failure to extend him a loan, McMordie was ineligible
for DTPA consumer status.40
The Texarkana Court of Appeals also had opportunity to rule on this
issue. In Megason v. Red River Employees Federal Credit Union4 l the
credit union filed suit against Megason to recover the balance due on a
renewal note, and Megason counterclaimed for DTPA violations alleging
33. Riverside Nat'l Bank v. Lewis, 603 S.W.2d 169, 173-75 (Tex. 1980).
34. See La Sara Grain Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of Mercedes, 673 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. 1984);
Flenniken v. Longview Bank & Trust Co., 661 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. 1983); Knight v. Interna-
tional Harvester Credit Corp., 627 S.W.2d 382 (Tex. 1982); Security Bank v. Dalton, 803
S.W.2d 443 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1991, writ denied); Irizarry v. Amarillo Pantex Fed.
Credit Union, 695 S.W.2d 91 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1985, no writ); see also Joel W. Reese,
Note, "Consumer" Status Under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act Requires a Borrower to
Base its Claim on the Underlying Goods or Services: Central Texas Hardware, Inc. v. First
City, Texas-Bryan, 810 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied), 23
TEX. TECH L. REV. 593 (1992); Richard M. Alderman & Melanie P. Rosenthal, A Con-
sumer Update: Recent Developments Under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 20 ST.
MARY's L.J. 495, 502 (1989).
35. 861 S.W.2d 284 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1993, no writ).
36. Id. at 285.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 286 (citing La Sara, 673 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. 1984); Flenniken, 661 S.W.2d 705
(Tex. 1983); Knight, 627 S.W.2d 382 (Tex. 1982)).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. 868 S.W.2d 871 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1993, n.w.h.).
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that when she secured the loans to purchase a car, the credit union mis-
represented to her that if it foreclosed its security interest in the car, it
would not resell the car for less than $6000.42 Concluding that Megason
did not qualify as a DTPA consumer, the trial court granted the credit
union's motion for summary judgment.43 Megason appealed.
Using the Riverside National Bank v. Lewis" line of reasoning, the
court analyzed the summary judgment evidence to determine whether or
not Megason qualified as a DTPA consumer. The court's inquiry focused
on whether or not the goods acquired formed the basis of her com-
plaint.45 After reviewing the evidence, the court concluded that
Megason's complaint was that the credit union sold the repossessed car
for less than the agreed amount. 46 Because her complaint related directly
to the "good acquired" with the funds from the loan-the car-the court
held that she satisfied the DTPA consumer test.4 7
II. PROPER DEFENDANT?
A. THE "INDIRECT PURCHASER" ARGUMENT - A DIFFERENT SPIN
ON THE INTENDED BENEFICIARY ARGUMENT.
In Knowlton v. United States Brass Corp.4 and Barrett v. United States
Brass Corp.,49 the plaintiffs faced a consumer-status challenge from
United States Brass. In these cases, home owners sued the defendant
companies under the DTPA for faulty plumbing systems in their homes.
The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants misrepresented the plumbing
systems installed in their homes to housing code bodies, homebuilders,
and city officials.50 While all other defendants settled with the plaintiff
home owners, United States Brass did not. Because it had never dealt
directly with any of the plaintiffs, United States Brass claimed that the
plaintiffs could not be DTPA consumers with respect to any transaction in
42. Id. at 872.
43. Id.
44. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
45. Megason, 868 S.W.2d at 873.
46. Id.
47. Id. In order to reconcile the decisions in Megason and McMordie, a distinction
must be made between the two. The most obvious distinction is that Megason actually
purchased a car with the loan proceeds while McMordie merely alleged that he intended to
use the money to purchase cattle. This analysis might be somewhat troubling since
McMordie never received funds from which he could have made the purchase, but for the
court's dicta stating that "[the] record [was] void of any objective manifestations that
McMordie sought or acquired, by purchase or lease, cattle which form the basis of his
complaint." McMordie, 861 S.W.2d at 285. The court's statement suggests that the evi-
dence presented at trial lacked ANY indication that McMordie ever planned on buying
cattle with the money. Quite simply, courts require the loan to be tied to some underlying
consumer transaction (i.e., the purchase or lease of a good or service), and they apparently
require some modicum of evidence to that effect.
48. 864 S.W.2d 585 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ granted).
49. 864 S.W.2d 606 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ granted).
50. Knowlton, 864 S.W.2d at 591; Barrett, 864 S.W.2d at 611.
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which they may have taken part.51 In short, United States Brass con-
tended that it was not a proper defendant for a DTPA action.
The Houston Court of Appeals disagreed with United States Brass'
contention in stating:
We do not believe the Texas Supreme Court has grafted onto the
definition of a consumer under the DTPA a requirement that, in or-
der to be a "consumer," representations must be made directly by
the defendant to the plaintiff or that the representations must be
made in connection with a transaction between the plaintiff and the
defendant. 52
Using the same line of cases discussed under the intended beneficiary
analysis,53 the court concluded that United States Brass was so "inextrica-
bly intertwined" 54 with the home builders that the plaintiffs were DTPA
consumers as to both the manufacturers and the builders.55 According to
these decisions, indirect purchasers have consumer standing under the
DTPA against the original seller of the good or service.
Applying the "indirect purchaser" doctrine from antitrust law,56 one
set of crafty defendants tried to discredit the plaintiffs' consumer standing
as indirect purchasers under the DTPA. In Segura v. Abbott Laborato-
51. Knowlton, 864 S.W.2d at 592-93; Barrett, 864 S.W.2d at 617-18.
52. Knowlton, 864 S.W.2d at 592-93; Barrett, 864 S.W.2d at 619.
53. The court cited to Kennedy, which initiated the intended beneficiary analysis, stat-
ing that to accept a construction of DTPA that only "direct purchasers" could be consum-
ers, "would be to read additional or different language into the DTPA, in contravention of
its mandate of liberal construction." Knowlton, 864 S.W.2d at 594; Barrett, 864 S.W.2d at
620. See also notes 5-17 and accompanying text; Melody Home Mfg. Co., 741 S.W.2d 349
(Tex. 1987); Flenniken, 661 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. 1983); Knight, 627 S.W.2d 382 (Tex. 1982);
and Cameron, 618 S.W.2d 535 (Tex. 1981).
54. The concept of "inextricably intertwined" and "tie-in" relationships originated in
cases attempting to hold a lender liable for DTPA violations. See Qantel Business Sys.,
Inc. v. Custom Controls Co., 761 S.W.2d 302, 305 (Tex. 1988) (holding a "tie-in" or "inex-
tricable intertwining" between seller and lender may cause plaintiff to be a consumer with
respect to both the financing company and the seller of the goods); Knight, 627 S.W.2d at
389 (holding that because the lender was "so inextricably intertwined" in truck's purchase,
it was of equal responsibility for the conduct of the sale); and Holland Mortgage Inv. Corp.
v. Bone, 751 S.W.2d 515,518 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (hold-
ing lender liable because a "tie-in" relationship existed between it and the builder of the
home). This theory of being inextricably intertwined focuses on the fact that both the
lender and the seller benefit from the underlying consumer transaction. Knowlton, 864
S.W.2d at 594; Barrett, 864 S.W.2d at 620. Once again, the inquiry focuses on intended
beneficiaries except the focal point is now the defendant and not the plaintiff.
55. Knowlton, 864 S.W.2d at 594; Barrett, 864 S.W.2d at 620. This argument could just
as easily have come under the "intended beneficiary" theory because in reality the
homebuilders purchased the plumbing system for the benefit of the end users - the
homeowners.
56. In the antitrust context, a "direct purchaser" is one who purchases goods or serv-
ices directly from a manufacturer, a wholesaler, or other entity who has violated section 4
of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1988). An "indirect purchaser" is one who
purchases such goods or services from a seller who is down line in the marketing chain
from the antitrust violator. The "Indirect Purchaser Doctrine" deprives an indirect pur-
chaser of standing to sue an antitrust violator because to allow otherwise would create
difficult issues as to how much of the monopoly price was "passed on" to the end consumer
by the middlemen. See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 741-47 (1977).
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ries, Inc.,57 the plaintiffs intervened in an antitrust suit originally brought
by the State of Texas. In the original action on behalf of the consumers,
the State of Texas sought injunctive relief and damages for alleged
overcharging for infant formula. Concluding that the Indirect Purchaser
Doctrine deprived the State of standing to sue, the trial court dismissed
the State's claims.58 The intervening plaintiffs alleged DTPA violations
based upon the same conduct in which the State premised its claims.5 9 In
response, the defendants argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing be-
cause to hold otherwise would allow the DTPA to conflict with the Texas
Antitrust Act. Accordingly, the defense argued that while the DTPA
does not address standing of indirect purchasers, the later-enacted Anti-
trust Act does, and therefore, should control. This would allow the Indi-
rect Purchaser Doctrine to come into play and deprive the plaintiffs of
standing to sue under the DTPA.60
Focusing on two points which indicated to the court that the legislature
did not intend to have the Texas Antitrust Act supersede or preempt the
DTPA, the court found the defendants' argument unpersuasive. First, the
court noted that both statutes included cumulative remedy provisions,
which allow a plaintiff to recover under the statute and other laws, as long
as such an application does not give rise to a double recovery.61 Second,
the court focused on the simple fact that whenever the legislature wanted
to exempt a certain type of defendant or claim from the purview of the
DTPA, it did so in unequivocal terms.62 "If the legislature had intended
to exclude indirect purchasers from coverage of the DTPA, 'it could eas-
ily have done so by simply drafting the restriction into the definition of
consumer or some other provision of the Act.' "63 In the absence of such
an express exemption in either the DTPA or the Texas Antitrust Act, the
court declined to hold that the Indirect Purchaser doctrine applied to the
DTPA.64 As "indirect purchasers" of the infant formula, the plaintiffs
qualified as consumers and could maintain a DTPA cause of action.
B. CAN DoCrORS BE SUED FOR DTPA VIOLATIONS?
In Sorokolit v. Rhodes6s the Texas Supreme Court examined the issue
of whether or not a physician or health care provider could be sued for
misrepresentations under the DTPA. Rhodes went to Dr. Sorokolit for
breast augmentation surgery. Dr. Sorokolit instructed her to pick out a
picture of a nude model, and then told her that he would give her identi-
cal breasts. Because the end result was not as promised, Rhodes sued Dr.
57. 873 S.W.2d 399 (Tex. App.-Austin 1994, writ granted).
58. Id. at 401.
59. Id.
60. IU
61. Id at 404.
62. Id. at 404-05.
63. Id at 405 (citing Cameron, 618 S.W.2d at 540).
64. Id. Also playing a part in the court's decision was the presumption against finding
statutes to be in conflict by implication. Id
65. No. D-3639, 1994 WL 138329 (Tex. Apr. 20, 1994).
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Sorokolit for medical malpractice, breach of implied and express warran-
ties under the DTPA, and knowing misrepresentations under the
DTPA.66 The trial court ruled that the Medical Liability and Insurance
Improvement Act 67 (MLIIA) prevented suits against physicians for
DTPA violations. 68 The court of appeals reversed in part, holding that
the MLIIA did not bar DTPA claims based on a knowing misrepresenta-
tion or a breach of express warranty.69 Agreeing with the Fort Worth
Court of Appeals, the Texas Supreme Court affirmed. 70
In reaching its conclusion, the court focused on the language of section
12.01(a) of the MLIIA. The language of that section clearly prohibits
would-be plaintiffs from filing DTPA suits against physicians or health
care providers when these suits are premised on "negligence." The court,
however, concluded that the theory of negligence does not encompass
"knowing" misrepresentations or breaches of express warranties. 71 Be-
cause these claims are not based in negligence, the supreme court held
that section 12.01(a) of the MLIIA did not exempt physicians and health
care providers from DTPA claims alleging breach of express warranty or
"knowing" misrepresentations. 72
III. FALSE, MISLEADING, DECEPTIVE OR
UNCONSCIONABLE ACTS
A. AN ACTIONABLE MISREPRESENTATION?
In Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. McDanie17 3 the Texas Supreme Court ad-
dressed the issue of whether or not statements made in a title insurance
policy constituted an actionable misrepresentation under the DTPA. The
McDaniels purchased title insurance on their new home from Chicago
Title. The policy provided that Chicago Title "for value does hereby
guarantee to the Insured... that as of the date hereof, the Insured has
good and indefeasible title to the estate or interest in the land described
or referred to in this policy."'74 A few years later, a bankruptcy court
notified the McDaniels that their property was subject to pre-existing
liens. After abandoning their home, the McDaniels filed suit against Chi-
66. Id. at *4.
67. Section 12.01(a) provides:
Notwithstanding any other law, no provision of Sections 17.41-17.63, Busi-
ness & Commerce Code, shall apply to physicians or health care providers as
defined in Section 1.03(3) of this Act, with respect to claims for damages for
personal injury or death resulting, or alleged to have resulted, from negli-
gence on the part of any physician or health care provider.
TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i § 12.01(1) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
68. 1994 WL 138329 at *5.
69. Id.; see also William Christopher Carmody & Mark A. Anderson, Deceptive Trade
Practices Act, ANNUAL SURVEY OF TEXAS LAW, 47 SMU L. REV. 1033, 1035-36 (1994).
70. Id. at *6.
71. Id. at *5.
72. Id. at *6. "[T]he underlying nature of the claim determines whether section
12.01(a) prevents suit for violations of the DTPA." Id.




cago Title alleging that its false representation of good title on their prop-
erty was a DTPA violation.75
Recognizing that a title insurance policy is a contract of indemnity, the
court stated that Chicago Title's sole duty is to indemnify the insured
against losses cause by defects in title.76 Because the very nature of a title
insurance policy is to indemnify against defects of title, the issuance of a
title policy by itself cannot constitute a representation regarding the per-
fected status of the property's title.77 While a title insurance company
could be held liable for affirmative representations that were the produc-
ing cause of damage to an insured,78 the court did not find any evidence
that Chicago Title made such affirmative representations. 79 Accordingly,
the supreme court reversed the court of appeals and rendered judgment
in favor of Chicago Title.80
B. SECTION 17.46(B)(12) MISREPRESENTATIONS
Quite a few courts decided cases containing allegations of violations
under section 17.46(b)(12) of the DTPA. This section makes the follow-
ing an unlawful deceptive trade practice: "representing that an agree-
ment confers or involved rights, remedies, or obligations which it does
not have or involve, or which are prohibited by law."' 81 While courts were
not confined to the literal meaning of the words used,82 the intent of the
legislature, "to protect consumers against false, misleading, and deceptive
business practices, unconscionable actions, and breaches or warranty,"8 3
controlled their decisions.
In West Anderson Plaza v. Feyznia,84 West Anderson Plaza (the "Land-
lord") sued Feyznia (the "Tenant") in a forcible-detainer action, and the
Tenant counterclaimed asserting violations of section 17.46(b)(12) of the
DTPA.85 At trial, the jury returned a verdict for the Tenant.s6 On ap-
peal, the Landlord argued that the evidence was insufficient to support a
DTPA violation.8 7
The tenant's DTPA argument alleged that the clause contained in an
addendum to his lease, which required him to provide a security guard
upon the request of the landlord was an actionable misrepresentation.
The landlord did not specify that this guard needed to be licensed until
after the parties entered into the lease and addendum. The Tenant
75. Id.
76. Id. at 311.
77. Id.
78. First Title Co. v. Garrett, 860 S.W.2d 74 (Tex. 1993).
79. McDaniel, 875 S.W.2d at 311.
80. Id.
81. DTPA § 17.46(b)(12).
82. Pennington v. Singleton, 606 S.W.2d 682, 686 (Tex. 1980).
83. DTPA § 17.44
84. 876 S.W.2d 528 (Tex. App.-Austin 1994, n.w.h.).





claimed this post-specification amounted to an affirmative misrepresenta-
tion in the actual contract. 88 Because disagreements about the meaning
of contractual provisions are the rule rather than the exception, common
sense dictates that such disagreements should not necessarily imply un-
fairness or deception. 89 Refusing to hold that the mere existence of an
ambiguous term or provision created a section 17.46(b)(12) violation, the
court attempted to discern what would cause such a violation.
The court sought out a standard of review. After analyzing three dif-
ferent approaches from other courts, the Feyznia court rejected all three
approaches.90 Settling on a mixture of the three, the court choose the
totality of the circumstances approach. 91 The court considered the fol-
lowing factors relevant:
1. whether the representation was clearly factual, clearly interpre-
tive, or some less clear combination of the two;
2. whether the relevant contractual language was ambiguous or
unambiguous;
3. whether the parties were in a substantially equal position of
knowledge and information;
4. whether there was evidence of overreaching or victimizing;
5. whether there was evidence of unconscionable conduct;
6. whether there was a confidential or fiduciary relationship between
the parties. 92
Analyzing these factors, the court found that the contractual language
was ambiguous and the Landlord's post-specification for a licensed guard
was merely interpretive of that provision. Further, the court did not be-
lieve any evidence of overreaching, victimization, or unconscionable ac-
tions existed. Accordingly, the court determined that the clause requiring
a security guard and the Landlord's later specification of a licensed guard,
did not violate section 17.46(b)(12) of the DTPA.93
88. Id. at 531-32.
89. Id at 532.
90. Id. In one case, the court fashioned a distinction between factual and interpretive
representations making the former actionable. Group Hosp. Serv., Inc. v. One & Two
Brookriver Ctr., 704 S.W.2d 886, 888-89 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ). In the next
case, the court drew a distinction between ambiguous and unambiguous language in a con-
tract, and made false representations about unambiguous language actionable. Quitta v.
Fossati, 808 S.W.2d 636, 644-46 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied). Because
both of these courts' distinctions require hair splitting, the Feyznia court rejected them.
Feyznia, 876 S.W.2d at 533. In the third and final case the Feyznia court looked to, Fina
Supply, Inc. v. Abilene Nat'l Bank, 726 S.W.2d 537, 540 (Tex. 1987), the court made a
distinction between statements of fact and of opinion, and stated that false statements of
fact would be actionable under common-law fraud claim. Id. Because misrepresentations
which do not rise to the level of fraud can be actionable under the DTPA, the Feyznia
court found the distinction inapplicable. Feyznia, 876 S.W.2d at 533.
91. Id. "Rather than attempting to determine the applicability of the DTPA from a
single factor such as ambiguity, we think it appropriate to view the totality of the circum-
stances." Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 534.
1124 [Vol. 48
DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES
In St. Paul Oil & Gas Corp. v. Trijon Exploration, Inc.,94 Trijon, an
unsuccessful bidder, which sought to purchase a working interest in an oil
and gas lease, sued the seller and its attorney for section 17.46(b)(12)
misrepresentations. At trial, the jury returned a verdict for the Trijon on
its DTPA claims. 95 The defendants appealed challenging the sufficiency
of the evidence showing such a DTPA violation.96
Trijon alleged that the defendants violated the DTPA when they mis-
represented their intent to award an oil and gas interest to the highest
bidder.97 According to Trijon, it was not willing to participate in further
bidding without an assurance that the defendants would award an en-
forceable sale contract to the highest bidder. In response to this demand,
Trijon claimed that Parrino, St. Paul's attorney, assured him that St. Paul
would sell to the highest bidder over $1 million. The defendants ada-
mantly denied these allegations. During the second round of bidding,
Trijon outbid the other bidder with a $1.225 million bid. Because Trijon's
bid was not fully funded, St. Paul awarded the oil and gas interest to the
other bidder. These events precipitated Trijon's DTPA suit.98
The court compared the defendants' alleged representation to sell to
the highest bidder to an auction "without reserve." 99 Under this compar-
ison, the court considered Trijon's higher bid as an acceptance of St.
Paul's offer to sell, creating a binding contract. While this dispute might
have been brought as a breach of an oral contract action, Trijon asserted
only that the defendants made an actionable DTPA misrepresentation. 00
Trijon claimed that the defendants' representation that St. Paul would
sell to highest bidder violated the DTPA because it represented that their
agreement conferred rights or involved rights or remedies which it did
not have. 101 A violation of this particular section of the DTPA, however,
requires the existence of an underlying contract the terms of which are
misrepresented. 10 2 Because no contract existed between Trijon and St.
Paul until after St. Paul's attorney made the alleged misrepresentation,
the defendants could not have violated this section of the DTPA.10 3 Ac-
cordingly, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of
94. 872 S.W.2d 27 (Tex. App.- Corpus Christi 1994, writ denied).
95. Id. at 27.
96. Id. at 27-28.
97. Id. at 28.
98. Id.
99. An auction "without reserve" means that once the auctioneer has called for bids,
he cannot withdraw the article from sale unless no proper bid is made within a reasonable
time. Id. "[An agreement to sell to the highest bidder constitutes an offer which is ac-
cepted and a contract formed upon the making of the highest bid by the successful bidder."
Id. (citing Intertex, Inc. v. Cowden, 728 S.W.2d 813, 818 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1986, no writ)).
100. Id. at 28.
101. Id. at 28-29 (citing TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(B)(12)).
102. Id. at 29 (citing Home Say. Assoc. Serv. Corp. v. Martinez, 788 S.W.2d 52, 56-57




the trial court and rendered a judgment that Trijon take nothing on its
DTPA claims.104
In Posey v. Southwestern Bell Yellow Pages, Inc. ,105 the Corpus Christi
Court of Appeals again addressed an alleged violation of this section of
the DTPA. The Poseys purchased a Yellow Page advertisement from the
defendant, listing their business name "Chiropractic Health Center," its
address, their individual names, and phone number. Even though the
same ad ran the year before, when the defendant published the following
year's Yellow Pages, the Poseys' personal listing fell under the business
name, address, and phone number of their competitors "Chiropractic
Health Services." While Southwestern Bell did not charge the Poseys for
the ad and gave them credit towards a free ad the following year, the
Poseys sued for damages on a host of claims, including the DTPA.'0 6
The Poseys claimed that the limitation of liability clause included in
their contract with the defendant 0 7 violated the DTPA because it repre-
sented that the agreement conferred or involved rights, remedies, or obli-
gations which are prohibited by law.' 08 Because waivers of the rights and
remedies provided under the DTPA are unenforceable and void, 1' 9 Posey
argued that the mere presence of a limitation of liability clause in the
contract created a violation of the DTPA.110 Observing that the limita-
tion of liability clause was otherwise valid, the court refused to rule for
the Poseys on this point because to do so would make the mere existence
of such a clause in a contract an automatic DTPA violation."'
104. Id.
105. 878 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, n.w.h.).
106. Id. at 278.
107. The limitation of liability clause was a general one. It read in part:
Disclaimer of Warranties and Limitation of Publisher's Liability. (a) Pub-
lisher intends to use its best efforts to ensure that all advertising is published
in accordance with this Agreement, but Publisher acknowledges and Adver-
tiser agrees that errors, omissions, delays or other mishaps may sometimes
occur. Publisher sets rates and accepts business only upon the basis that Pub-
lisher is under no liability in such a case, except as provided herein. (b) Ac-
cordingly, it is a fundamental term of this Agreement and Advertiser agrees
that publisher's liability in money damages shall relate to the degree of error
made in context to the total advertising, but in no event shall such liability
exceed an amount equal to that paid for the items of advertising omitted, or in
which the error occurs, for the items of advertising omitted, or in which the
error occurs, for the issue life of the directory.
Id. at 278 (emphasis in original). The clause did not single out DTPA damages, attempting
to waive a consumer's rights and remedies under that statute. Instead, the clause sought to
limit liability under all potential theories of liability. In fact, Southwestern Bell conceded
that the clause is ineffective to limit damages awarded under a DTPA claim, except a claim
premised on the breach of warranty provision, Id at 280.
108. Id. at 280 (tracking the language of DTPA § 17.46(b)(12)).
109. DTPA § 17.42.
110. Posey, 878 S.W.2d at 280.
111. Id. "[T]o use an otherwise valid contractual provision to transform a breach of
contract action into a DTPA violation appears to be at odds with both common sense and
recent decisions in this area." Ida (citing Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. FDP Corp., 811
S.W.2d 572, 576-77 (Tex. 1991) (liability limitation part of "basis of the bargain" and en-
forceable against claim of breach of warranty under DTPA)).
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IV. WAS THE BAD ACT A "PRODUCING CAUSE" OF THE
CONSUMER'S DAMAGES?
In order to recover damages for any deceptive act or practice, the con-
sumer must prove that the defendant's conduct was a producing cause. 112
A producing cause is an efficient, exciting or contributing cause, which in
the natural sequence, produced injuries or damages. 113 There can be
more than one producing cause of damages. 1 4 While the law does not
require reliance or foreseeability," 5 some causal connection must exist
between the deceptive act and actual damages suffered. 116
In Peeler v. Hughes & Luce,117 a convicted criminal sued her attorney,
David Jordan, and his law firm. She alleged that he committed malprac-
tice because he failed to inform her of the offer of immunity made by the
prosecution. She sought damages under theories of negligence, gross
negligence, DTPA violations, breach of contract, and breach of implied
warranty."l 8 The trial court granted summary judgment for the
defendants. 19
As an officer of Hillcrest Equities, a securities trading corporation,
Peeler came under federal investigation by the IRS. She hired Jordan to
represent her. Shortly after the investigation began, the assistant United
States Attorney in charge called Jordan and extended an unequivocal of-
fer of transactional immunity to Peeler in exchange for her cooperation in
the investigation. Jordan never informed Peeler of this offer. Regardless,
another suspect took the immunity offer and provided the government
with the information necessary to prosecute Peeler and the others. Based
on the government's case, Peeler plead guilty to "aiding and assisting the
filing of a false and fraudulent U.S. Partnership Return of Income for
Byrd Investments.' 20 Peeler was convicted.' 2'
After learning of the government's immunity offer, she filed this suit.
She alleged that Jordan's failure to inform her of the immunity offer was
the producing cause of her conviction. 22 Focusing on how producing
cause should be determined in the criminal context, the ultimate question
before the court was whether or not Jordan's failure to inform Peeler of
the immunity offer constituted an actionable misrepresentation under the
DTPA.
112. Weitzel v. Barnes, 691 S.W.2d 598, 600 (Tex. 1985).
113. Rourke v. Garza, 530 S.W.2d 794, 801 (Tex. 1975).
114. Id
115. Allied Towing Service v. Mitchell, 833 S.W.2d 577, 585 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992,
no writ).
116. Weitzel, 691 S.W.2d at 602-03.
117. 868 S.W.2d 823 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, writ granted).
118. Id.
119. Id The defendants alleged that for policy and other reasons, Peeler's own actions
were the producing cause of her damages. Id. They further alleged that Peeler had not
exhausted her remedies by attempting to have the conviction or her plea set aside first. Id
120. Id at 826.
121. Id.
122. Id Peeler claimed that she plead guilty on the advice of Jordan and other Hughes
& Luce attorneys. Id
1995] 1127
SMU LAW REVIEW
In this case of first impression, the Dallas Court of Appeals determined
that a different standard of producing cause applied to criminal cases. 123
Noting the strong policy reasons that exist for not allowing a criminal to
profit from his crime, the court concluded that a guilty defendant's own
culpability supersedes all other potential "producing" or "proximate"
causes of his conviction.' 24 Because the criminal's culpability prevents
him from establishing the critical element of cause-in-fact necessary to
show "producing" and "proximate" cause, a guilty defendant cannot
bring a negligence or DTPA action against his attorney. Because produc-
ing causation requires the same finding of cause-in-fact as proximate cau-
sation, a guilty defendant could not establish the producing causation
element of a DTPA claim.125
Based on the court's analysis of the producing cause element, the via-
bility of Peeler's DTPA claim rested on whether or not she could estab-
lish her innocence. The evidence established that Peeler admitted her
guilt, entered a guilty plea, was convicted, and failed to obtain any post-
conviction relief prior to summary judgment. 126 According to the court,
.the evidence foreclosed any possibility of Peeler raising a question of fact
regarding her innocence.' 27 Concluding that Peeler's criminal actions
were necessarily the producing and proximate cause of her indictment
and conviction, the court affirmed the trial court's summary judgment for
defendants. 128
In Camden Machine & Tool, Inc. v. Cascade Co.129 the Fort Worth
Court of Appeals also disposed of a DTPA claim based on the element of
producing cause. In Camden Machine, the purchaser of a building, Cam-
den Machine & Tool, Inc., brought suit against the seller, a real estate
firm, and the appraisers on a variety of grounds including violations of
the DTPA. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendants, and Camden Machine appealed.' 30
The underlying dispute arose out of Camden Machine's purchase of an
office warehouse from Cascade. Prior to closing the deal, Camden
Machine had an appraiser look at the property. The appraiser's report
disclosed a number of defects, including a crack in the foundation. After
reviewing the report, John A. Burgoyne, the president and owner of
123. Id. at 827-33. "Because Texas courts have not specifically determined this issue of
proximate or producing causation in the criminal malpractice context by utilizing public
policy, we review the law of our sister jurisdictions." Id. at 829. After looking at the law of
other jurisdictions, the court found that most require the criminal to establish his inno-
cence of the underlying offense. Id. Only by establishing his innocence, can a convicted
criminal show that his or her attorney's malpractice was a proximate or producing cause of
his or her conviction. Id. at 831.
124. Id. at 827-33.
125. Id at 832 (citing Title Agency of Texas v. Arellano, 835 S.W.2d 750, 754-55 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
126. Peeler, 868 S.W.2d at 833.
127. Id.
128. Id at 835.




Camden Machine, went to view the crack. Before closing occurred, Bur-
goyne brought in several other contractors to investigate the condition of
the foundation. Their bids ranged from $7500 to $16,000 to repair the
crack; however, each bid was conditioned on further soil samples. With-
out conducting such soil tests, Burgoyne adjusted the repair allowance to
reflect this defect. He also tried to negotiate a price reduction, but was
unsuccessful. Camden Machine closed on the property anyway. Shortly
after the closing, Burgoyne discovered that cause of the crack, which was
actually a complete break, was a storm drain that ran underneath the
crack. Because of the permanent nature of the defect, Camden Machine
filed suit alleging among other claims, violations of the DTPA.131
In deciding whether or not any of the defendants made actionable mis-
representations under the DTPA, the court looked at two cases with simi-
lar facts, O'Hern v. Hogard132 and Dubow v. Dragon.133 In O'Hern, the
defendants failed to disclose that the foundation was settling. During an
inspection made prior to closing on the property, the buyers discovered
the settling. In the DTPA case that followed, the court concluded that a
buyer's "reliance on an independent inspection was not, in and of itself,
enough to constitute a new and independent basis for the purchase of a
dwelling."'134 Because the court held that the inspection did not super-
sede the defendants' misrepresentations as a producing cause, the
O'Hern buyers had an actionable DTPA claim. In Dubow, however, the
court held the exact opposite. The Dubow court held that the producing
cause of damage was the buyer's "reliance on the inspection and profes-
sional opinions which constituted a new and independent basis for the
purchase.' 35 This finding foreclosed the buyer's DTPA claims, as a mat-
ter of law.
Drawing factual distinctions between the two cases, the Camden
Machine court determined that the case before it was more like the
Dubow case.136 The court held that Camden Machine's reliance on de-
131. Id. at 309.
132. 841 S.W.2d 135 (Tex. App,-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ).
133. 746 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no writ).
134. Camden Machine, 870 S.W.2d at 312 (citing O'Hern, 841 S.W.2d at 138).
135. Camden Machine, 870 S.W.2d at 312 (citing Dubow, 746 S.W.2d at 860).
136. Camden Machine, 870 S.W.2d at 312-13. The court distinguished the case from
O'Hern. In O'Hern, the record lacked evidence that the buyers would have bought the
house if the structural defects had been disclosed. O'Hern, 841 S.W.2d at 137. In Camden
Machine, Burgoyne still wanted the building even after all that he had discovered after the
closing about the nature of the. defects. Camden Machine, 870 S.W.2d at 313. The court
concluded that these facts proved that he would have gone through with the purchase even
if he had known everything prior to the closing. Id. Like the Dubow buyers, Burgoyne
employed contractors, one of whom was a foundation specialist, to come in and inspect the
damage. Id. at 312-13. Based on these specialized inspections, the Dubow court stated "it
is obvious that the Dubows did not rely on any alleged misrepresentations or failures to
disclose since the Dubows hired experts of their own to inspect the house, and they relied
on these experts in negotiating and obtaining a contract modification affording them a
reduced purchase price." Dubow, 746 S.W.2d at 860. Unlike the Dubow buyers, Burgoyne
was unsuccessful in negotiating a price reduction based on the estimates. Regardless, the
court concluded that he had adequate knowledge prior to closing, and therefore, could not
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fendants' misrepresentations was superseded by its reliance on the ap-
praisal of the property and the follow-up inspections. 137 Because
defendants' misrepresentations were not the producing cause of Camden
Machine's damages, the court affirmed the trial court's summary judg-
ment as to Camden Machine's DTPA claims.138
V. DAMAGES
Under the DTPA, a plaintiff must establish that he is a consumer, that
the defendant committed a deceptive trade practice, and that such con-
duct was the producing cause of damage. Once the plaintiff establishes
each of these elements, he is entitled to recover compensation for his
damages. What damages can be compensated? How should damages be
calculated? Consumers commonly encounter these issues when pursuing
their DTPA claims.
In Boat Superstore, Inc. v. Haner'39 the trial court entered a default
judgment against Boat Superstore, Inc. (Superstore), and Superstore ap-
pealed the award of damages. The underlying dispute arises out of Ha-
ner's purchase of a boat, motor, and trailer (the "property") from
Superstore. Haner financed his purchase by entering a purchase security
agreement (Agreement) with Superstore. Superstore assigned the
Agreement to John Deere Company. Attempting to foreclose its lien on
the property, Deere sued Haner. Haner counterclaimed, and filed a third
party action against Superstore, alleging that defendants' violated the
DTPA. Haner and Deere settled their suit, but Superstore failed to an-
swer, therefore Haner took a default judgment. On appeal, Superstore
challenged both the default judgment and the award of damages.
Concerning the trial court's award of damages, the Houston Court of
Appeals addressed two main points of error: 1) Did the trial court err by
awarding $2545 in credit damages because Haner did not specifically
plead credit damages in his petition; and 2) did the trial court err by auto-
matically trebling the actual damages awarded where no evidence existed
indicating Superstore acted "knowingly"?140 Because the Texas Supreme
Court classified credit damages as consequential damages, they must be
specifically pled to be recovered. 14' Accordingly, the court sustained
Superstore's first main point of error regarding credit damages because
Haner had not specifically plead them in his petition.
142
now claim that he relied on the defendants' misrepresentations or failures to disclose.
Camden Machine, 870 S.W.2d at 312-13.
137. Camden Machine, 870 S.W.2d at 312-13 (following the court's analysis of O'Hern
and Dubow).
138. Id. at 313.
139. 877 S.W.2d 376 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, n.w.h.).
140. Id. at 379-80.
141. Henry S. Miller Co. v. Bynum, 836 S.W.2d 160, 163-64 (Tex. 1992). The supreme
court stated that credit damages result naturally from such acts, but not necessarily. Haner,
877 S.W.2d at 379. Therefore, the court held that credit damages are to be classified as
consequential or special damages. Id.
142. Haner, 877 S.W.2d at 379.
[Vol. 481130
1995] DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES 1131
With regard to the second point of error, the Haner court observed that
the trebling of damages was equivalent to an unliquidated damage
amount. 143 When a plaintiff seeks a default judgment and damages are
unliquidated, he must prove the connection between the liability and his
injuries. 1 " As a result, the court required Haner to prove that Super-
store acted "knowingly" in order to establish his entitlement to treble
damages.' 45 After reviewing the record, the Houston Court of Appeals
failed to find the necessary evidence indicating that Superstore acted
"knowingly."'146 Thus, the court sustained this point of error as well, and
reversed and remanded the case.' 47
In Knowlton v. United States Brass,'148 discussed previously, the court
also tackled two issues regarding the award of damages to successful
DTPA claimants. In the first issue, U.S. Brass contended that the trial
court erred when it awarded certain DTPA plaintiffs an amount in excess
of their actual damages because U.S. Brass had offered to settle with
those plaintiffs for the amount of their actual damages.' 49 After review-
ing U.S. Brass' settlement offer, the court concluded that they did not
constitute offers, but were merely invitations to negotiate. °50 As a result,
the court overruled this point of error, and allowed the claimants a full
recovery. 15'
In its second point of error regarding damages, U.S. Brass alleged that
it was entitled to a judgment credit for fifty percent of the actual damages
found for some of the DTPA plaintiffs because Vanguard, another de-
143. Id. at 379-80.
144. Id. at 380 (citing Morgan v. Compugraphics Corp., 675 S.W.2d 729, 731-32 (Tex.
1984)).
145. Haner, 871 S.W.2d at 380.
146. 1d.
147. Id.
148. 864 S.W.2d 585 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1993, writ granted).
149. 1& at 595. Under § 17.505(c), any person who receives notice of a consumer's
DTPA claim under § 17.505(a) may tender to the consumer a written settlement offer
within a specified period of time. DTPA §§ 17.505(a), (c). If the consumer rejects the
settlement offer, it may be filed with the court along with an affidavit certifying its rejec-
tion. DTPA § 17.505(d). "If the amount tendered in the settlement offer is the same as or
more than, or if the court finds the amount to be "substantially the same" as, the actual
damages found by the trier of fact, the consumer may not recover an amount in excess of
the amount tendered in the settlement offer or the amount of actual damages found by the
trier of fact, whichever is less." DTPA § 17.505(d). U.S. Brass offered to replace the
plumbing systems in these plaintiffs' houses and pay for any costs they incurred because
they were displaced from their homes during the replacement work. Knowlton, 864 S.W.2d
at 595.
150. U.S. Brass's offers basically sought to cover the plaintiffs' actual damages. The
parties stipulated to the amount of actual damages before trial. Knowlton, 864 S.2d at 595.
As a result, the only amounts left up to the jury were special damages, exemplary damages,
and attorneys fees. Id. Thus, if the court had ruled that U.S. Brass's offers constituted
valid offers and limited the plaintiffs' recovery to actual damages only, a horrible precedent
would have been set. Such a precedent would allow guilty defendants to limit their liability
under the DTPA to just actual damages. Under such a ruling, when the defendants recog-
nized their guilt, they could make offers for only actual damages, and effectively limit the
claimants' recovery to those damages because such a ruling would prevent the claimants
from recovering any excess damages at trial.
151. I. at 596.
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fendant, settled with them for approximately half the value of actual dam-
ages. 152 Even though Chapter 32 of the Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code applies to suits based on the DTPA, the statute is silent
about the right of contribution against settling tortfeasors who are not
parties to the final judgment.153 At common law, however, the courts
developed two credit schemes for reducing the damages paid by the non-
settling defendant by the amount paid by the settlors. Under the first
scheme, the nonsettling defendant received a credit for the dollar amount
of the settlement.154 The other method is a proportionate reduction in
damages. 155 In its briefing, U.S. Brass premised its election of credit for
settlements on the claims to which Chapter 33 of the Texas Civil Practice
and Remedies Code applies. 156 Because Chapter 32 applied and not
Chapter 33, the court held that U.S. Brass had not elected any credit
scheme; therefore, the trial court did not err when it applied a dollar for
dollar credit. 157
VI. LIMITATIONS
While several cases addressed the applicability of limitations to as-
serted DTPA claims, 158 only one case merits discussion. In Bara v. Major
Funding Corp. Liquidation Trust,159 the Baras filed suit against the de-
fendant, the assignee of a retail installment contract, alleging DTPA vio-
lations. The Baras entered into the contract with B & B Siding Wholesale
(B & B). After the Baras signed the contract, B & B sold'the contract to
the defendant. About eighteen months later, the Baras complained to
the office of the Texas attorney general about the terms of the contract.
In response to the Baras' complaint, the attorney general notified the
Baras of the on-going lawsuit it had pending against the defendant, and
informed them that they would be included in the group of homeowners
covered by that suit. 16° When the attorney general negotiated its settle-
152. Id. at 598.
153. Id. at 599. (citing Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Sterling, 822 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Tex. 1991)
and Cypress Creek Util. Serv. Co. v. Muller, 640 S.W.2d 860, 862 (Tex. 1982)).
154. Bradshaw v. Baylor University, 126 Tex. 99, 84 S.W.2d 703 (1935).
155. Palestine Contractors, Inc. v. Perkins, 386 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. 1964).
156. Knowlton, 864 S.W.2d at 599.
157. Id.
158. Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Stephens, 871 S.W.2d 317, 321 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1994,
writ denied) (holding that date of discovery is a jury question); Knowlton, 864 S.W.2d 585(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ granted) (holding that there was insufficient
evidence to establish privity between former homeowners and plaintiffs so as to impute
knowledge of Defendant's DTPA violation and cause the discovery rule to kick in sooner
and bar the entire action); and Barrett, 864 S.W.2d 606, 635-36 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1993, writ granted) (holding limitations barred some actions where the plaintiffs, in
the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered the defendant's violation of
the DTPA).
159. 876 S.W.2d 469 (Tex. App.-Austin 1994, writ denied).
160. Id. at 471. Based on similar complaints, the attorney general had filed suit prior to
receiving the Baras' complaint. Pursuant to DTPA § 17.47, the attorney general can bring
an action in the public interest and in the name of the State of Texas against any entity that
it believes is engaged in conduct prohibited by the DTPA.
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ment with the defendant, it extended a settlement package to the Baras.
After consulting with an independent attorney, the Baras rejected the set-
tlement offer, and filed this suit. The trial court granted the defendant's
motion for summary judgment based on limitations, and the Baras
appealed.' 61
Presented with a case of first impression, the Austin Court of Appeals
decided whether or not an action brought by the attorney general pursu-
ant to section 17.47 of the DTPA in response to consumer complaints
tolls the running of the statute of limitations on the consumer's individual
claims. 162 Because of the similarities, the court looked to the laws gov-
erning class actions for guidance in its decision.' 63 While no Texas cases
had considered the situation of a plaintiff who "opted out" of a class ac-
tion, federal courts had considered this issue. Federal courts held that
tolling applies to those class members who opt-out and later file their
own suits.164
Arguing that their situation was analogous to an "opt-out" in a federal
class action situation, the Baras alleged that the statute of limitations
should have been tolled during the course of the attorney general's
suit.165 Agreeing with the Baras' argument, the court concluded "that in
situations in which the attorney general files suit under section 17.47 of
the DTPA on behalf of a specified group of individuals, that suit qualifies
as a de facto class action and the statute of limitations is tolled during the
period in which the individuals are participants in the attorney general's
suit."'166 Accordingly, the Austin Court of Appeals reversed and re-
manded the case.167
161. Bara, 876 S.W.2d at 471.
162. Id
163. Id
164. Id. See Tosti v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1485, 1489 (9th Cir. 1985); see also
Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345 (1983).
165. Bara, 876 S.W.2d at 471.
166. Id. at 472-73.
167. Id. at 473.
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